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Abstract
This paper aims to address supply chain partners' incentives for information sharing from an information systems design
perspective. Specifically, we consider a supply chain characterized by N geographically distributed retailers who order a
homogeneous product from one manufacturer. Each retailer's demand risk consists of two parts: a systematic risk part that affects
all retailers and an idiosyncratic risk part that only has a local effect. We propose a macro prediction market to effectively elicit and
aggregate useful information about systematic demand risk. We show that such information can be used to achieve accurate
demand forecast sharing and better channel coordination in the supply chain system. Our market-based framework extends the
range of information sharing beyond the supply chain system. It also opens the door for other corporate risk management
opportunities to hedge against aggregate economic risk.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Information asymmetry is a main source of systems
inefficiency in many areas. For example, the well-known
bullwhip effect [22,31] refers to the information distortion
that is caused by misaligned incentives to share private
demand information truthfully among self-interested sup-
ply chain partners, resulting in direct deadweight losses in
social welfare. Truthful information sharing has been pro-
posed as a solution to the bullwhip effect. Over the past few
years, new business initiatives enabled by emerging tech-
nologies such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID), and XML-streamlined
workflow management have facilitated information shar-
ing in decentralized business environments. However, a
technologically effective system does not necessarily result
in improved decision quality unless it is economically
efficient as well. Systems could still be inefficient if users
only strategically report information for their own benefit.
We seek to investigate the incentive issues for supply chain
information sharing. In particular, we propose a market-
based framework to understand how conflicting incentives
can be aligned and useful information can be elicited in the
new supply chain information systems design so that a
broad scope of benefits can be achieved.
In this paper, we consider a simple two-echelon sup-
ply chain characterized by N geographically distributed
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retailers who order a homogeneous product from one
manufacturer. Each retailer serves her own consumer
market whose demand uncertainty can be expressed as the
sum of two randomelements— amacro risk factor and an
idiosyncratic risk factor. The macro factor represents the
systematic risks caused by uncertain macroeconomic
events that affect all retailers, such as an economic down-
turn. The idiosyncratic factor represents local market risks
unique to individual retailers, such as the effect of weather
on their localmarkets. Before a selling season each retailer
receives a noisy signal about the macro risk and order
inventory from themanufacturer based on the information
available to her. The manufacturer, who has no consumer
demand information, is interested in forecasting expected
aggregate orders from all retailers. The retailers, who bear
the uncertainty of the consumer markets, are interested in
effectively forecasting future demand. Our goal is to de-
sign a new supply chain information system that aligns
different supply chain partners' self-interests and thus en-
ables more effective information sharing and better deci-
sion-making. Some critical questions must be answered in
pursuit of this goal: What information could and should be
shared? How do we effectively share this information?
In answer to the first question, we argue that the new
information system should focus on forecasting element at
an appropriate aggregation level. A too broad forecasting
goal may seem less relevant and a too narrow forecasting
goal may not attract sufficient attention, leading to a less
effective prediction. In this supply chain context, we should
focus on the macro factor that will affect all the retailers
instead of extracting individual retailers' overall forecasts.
There are several reasons. First, the manufacturer is most
interested in the macro factor forecast since the idiosyn-
cratic risks are independent. The total idiosyncratic effects
from all the retailers can be cancelled out by the Law of
Large Numbers. Second, individual retailers are not inte-
rested in sharing their idiosyncratic factor forecasts because
they have the best knowledge and are not concerned with
the local risk of others. They are, however, interested in
macro factor forecast because it affects the forecast accu-
racy of their own demand. This common interest among all
supply chain partners can guarantee market liquidity and
ensure that no individual's private interests can signifi-
cantly mislead the aggregate opinion. Manipulation of in-
formation can be potentially reduced. Therefore, a market
designed to forecast the macro factor (i.e., a macro pre-
diction market) is a viable candidate mechanism to elicit
and share dispersed information.
As to the mechanism for effective information sharing,
using a prediction market to elicit information is an emer-
ging research field. A prototype example is the Iowa
Electronic Market (IEM: http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/)
that predicts presidential election outcomes. Other exam-
ples include the Hollywood Stock Exchange Market
(http://www.hsx.com), primarily used to predict enter-
tainment events such asmovie sales, and Goldman Sachs'
Economic Derivatives Market (http://www.gs.com/econ-
derivs/), inwhich likely outcomes of future economic data
releases (such as retail sales or industry production) are
traded. In our context, the macro prediction market is
designed as a real money futures market, in which a retail
index with a payoff dependent on the future realization of
the macro factor is traded.
The macro prediction market has many benefits. First,
themarket offers a goodmechanism to effectively combine
beliefs in producing a reliable forecast. Market participants
with heterogeneous beliefs express their opinions about the
retail index through their trading behaviors. Since traders
who make better predictions can expect higher payoffs, the
prediction market can effectively attract whoever have
good information and aggregate it. Second, the market
aligns traders' incentives to trade because no individual is
pivotal in influencing market price. Once the number of
participants is large enough, one retailer's nonparticipation
or misrepresentation of information decreases only that
retailer's own profitability. It affects neither market price
nor the accuracy of market prediction conveyed in the
price. Therefore, the retailer's dominant strategy is to trade
according to true information. Third, the market is an open
system that absorbs useful information from sources out-
side the supply chain system. Speculators, liquidity traders
and others can participate as long as they believe they have
relevant information. This increases market liquidity and
improves forecast effectiveness as the number of market
participants increases. Finally, using futures markets in
macro variables affecting the economy to hedge currently
unhedgeable risks is amarket innovation advocated byRef.
[29]. Our idea of a macro prediction market opens the door
for new opportunities in corporate risk management.
In this paper, we develop a model that shows that the
information incorporated into the macro prediction mar-
ket price is accurate enough to reduce the supply chain's
total forecast uncertainty. The information also reduces
the retailer's order variance, which can significantly alle-
viate the bullwhip effect. We demonstrate that demand
forecast sharing and channel coordination can be collec-
tively achieved in the macro prediction market-based
supply chain information system. Expected supply chain
efficiency is improved under market coordination.
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first
to incorporate a prediction market in a supply chain con-
tractual context. Since our focus is the informational con-
tent of creating newmarket on supply chain efficiency, we
limit our investigation of the contract format to the widely
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used price-only contract, i.e., the manufacturer sets a unit
wholesale price and leaves the order quantity decisions to
the retailers. Other complicated contract forms such as
reorder/buy back contracts, non-linear pricing/quantity
discount policy, and linear transfer payments are possible.
We choose the simple contract form in order to generate
and present some clean analytical insights.
This paper is organized as follows. We review related
literature in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our base
model under a supply chain information sharing frame-
work. We analyze the manufacturer's and retailers' deci-
sion problems and discuss the construction of a macro
prediction market. We further explore the value of infor-
mation sharing and properties such as order variances and
supply chain efficiency in Section 4. We extend the mar-
ket's role of information aggregation to risk hedging in
Section 5. We conclude in Section 6 with an agenda for
future research.
2. Related literature
The value of information sharing has been widely stu-
died in the supply chain literature (e.g., [8,9,24]). One
solution to alleviate the bullwhip effect was centralizing
demand information from supply chain partners [10].
However, information sharing across the supply chain is
not easily achievable. In general, there is a conflict of in-
centives in supply chain systems; individuals manipulate
information solely for their own benefit. An effective in-
formation system should be able to align incentives from
users with conflicting objectives. Incentive alignment be-
comes an important third dimension (preceded by software
engineering and user acceptance perspectives) for any so-
phisticated information systems design and evolution [2].
In this paper, following the finance literature, we
represent retailers' demand uncertainty in two parts: sys-
tematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Idiosyncratic risk sha-
ring has attracted considerable attention in the supply chain
field. For example, Risk pooling in inventory and alloca-
tion decisions by retailers facing local stochastic demands
was considered in Ref. [1]. The impact of a secondary
market was examined by Ref. [23] where retailers (“re-
sellers” in their paper) can trade their excess inventories
associated with independent demand risks among each
other. Since systematic risk cannot be reduced by risk
pooling, it was suggested to use macro economy related
market instruments to hedge certain aggregate economic
risks [29]. This paper complements previous work by in-
vestigating the role of information aggregation in dealing
with systematic risk.
Economic theory has long recognized that a properly
designed market efficiently collects and disseminates in-
formation [16]. New market efficiency research suggests
that information markets can effectively aggregate infor-
mation and produce advance forecasts of uncertain out-
comes. An informationmarket is primarily designed for the
purpose of eliciting a particular piece of information. It is an
emerging form of financial markets in which the settling
contracts are futures contracts. It is also called “ideas
futures”, “event futures”, “Internet-based virtual stockmar-
ket”, etc. A survey on research in information markets was
given by Ref. [34]. It was further suggested that informa-
tion market-based forecast could be used for effective de-
cision support [4]. Empirical study also showed evidence
that Internet-based virtual stock market forecasts out-
perform alternative methods such as surveys and opinion
polls [30]. It was proposed that organizing Internet-based
interactions to better gather predictive information. We
complement previous work by theoretically justifying the
reliability of the market prediction mechanism. Moreover,
we integrate the prediction function into the decision sup-
port and theoretically validate both market performance
and efficiency improvement in the supply chain application.
Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE; see e.g. Refs.
[26,14]) is the theoretical support for the information
revelation and aggregation in market transactions. The key
to the REE concept is that the act of trading conveys in-
formation. The learning in the market is solved via an
application of Bayesian rule [27]. This research shows how
the market can provide an incentive to effectively aggre-
gate and reveal private information and howmarket price is
a sufficient statistic for predicting the demandmacro factor.
The concept of REE has been applied to supply chains to
study the informational role of an industrial exchange (see
Refs. [25,33]). Previous work viewed spot market trading
as an opportunity to readjust inventory positions and share
information about demand uncertainty. In contrast, we
propose a futures market trading a financial index whose
future payoff depends on realization of the macro factor. In
our futures market, demand uncertainty information can be
revealed early and incorporated into the supply chain part-
ners' decisionmaking. Ourmarket has two other important
advantages. First, the trading information indices rather
than the physical commodities can reduce transaction costs
and so improve market liquidity. Second, our prediction
market allows outside traders to present their relevant
knowledge, extending the range of information sharing.
Our modeling framework is distinct from all previous
work in information economics. By dividing demand un-
certainty into a systematicmacro factor and an idiosyncratic
local factor, we propose trading a retail index representing
systematic risk in the supply chain in a macro prediction
market, which has strong resemblance to a financial mar-
ket. This idea is consistent with the findings that a firm's
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demand has a strong correlation with some financial index
[13]. A number of details about the construction of new
markets and a variety of new products to deal with macro
economic uncertainty from a risk hedging perspective were
provided by Ref. [29]. In contrast, we focus on the in-
formational role of markets and extend its function to risk
hedging in the supply chain information system.
We study a supply chain in the framework of news-
vendor problem. The traditional newsvendor model only
takes into account a single decision maker's order quantity
decisionwhen facing exogenous demand distribution [18].
Strategic interactions between a manufacturer and a re-
tailer were studied by Ref. [21]. Their model allowed the
manufacturer to change the wholesale price and the uncer-
tain demand distribution can be updated through forecas-
ting.We extend the demand forecast tomultiple retailers in
a market framework. In terms of market setup, our model
is comparable with the work in Refs. [19] and [20] in
which the information was revealed through the trading of
a financial asset. As to the market structure, we both
assume that orders are batched together to transact at a
single regret-free, market-clearing price.
3. The model
Consider N geographically distributed retailers who
order a homogeneous product from a manufacturer. Each
retailer faces uncertain market demand, composed of sys-
tematic risks that affect all the markets and idiosyncratic
risks that affect only the local market. We express the
retailer i's demand as Di=ai+biθ+εi, i=1,…, N, where
hfN l; 1s
 1 is a systematic macro economic factor and
eifNð0; 1seÞ is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic random factor. We
assume that ai and bi are known constants that could differ
among different retailers but these are common knowledge
in the supply chain.
We assume that each retailer can privately derive a
forecast (or obtain a private signal) θ˜i for the macro
economic factor θ. Denote θ˜i=θ+δi, where difN 0; 1sd
 
is also i.i.d., indicating the forecast error. We also assume
that τδ>τ. This condition implies that the forecast is in-
formative because the forecast variance is less than the
variance of the prior distribution of the macro factor.
Suppose the private information from individual re-
tailers can be aggregated and define the aggregate signal as
h¯ u 1N
P
N
i¼1 h˜i ¼ hþ
1
N
X N
i¼1
di, which is a sufficient statistic
for the full information reflected in a set of signal
realizations (θ˜1,θ˜2,…, θ˜N). θ¯ is the best predictor compared
with any individual forecast since it has the same mean
but the least variance. We call this case truthful forecast
sharing. Corresponding to this scenario is the aggregate
information supply chain structure (Structure A). This
provides us with a full information benchmark solution
to whichwe compare two other supply chain structures: a
fully decentralized one (Structure D) and a macro
prediction market-coordinated one (Structure M).
The supply chain partners' decision problems are the
same under all three supply chain structures. The manu-
facturer sets a wholesale price to maximize the expected
profit based on the expected aggregate retailer order quan-
tity. Given the manufacturer's wholesale price, each re-
tailer decides on an optimal order quantity based on her
demand distribution forecast. The only difference among
the three structures is the information incorporated in fore-
casting the demand distribution. In the truthful forecast
sharing scenario (Structure A), the manufacturer has ac-
cess to all the information. In the fully decentralized sce-
nario (Structure D), the manufacturer cannot observe any
of the retailers' forecasts. From a social welfare perspec-
tive, full information sharingwill generate higher expected
supply chain profits. However, because higher individual
retailer's profit is not guaranteed, it is not clear if a retailer
will want to truthfully share information. To achieve the
goal of information sharing, we design a macro prediction
market-coordinated supply chain structure (Structure M)
to trade a retail index. The retail index is an aggregate
economic measure for the macro factor θ. For simplicity,
we assume that the retail index payoff is exactly θ, de-
pending on the future realized value of the macro factor.
The index market price is a public signal that the manu-
facturer and retailers use to update their beliefs about
demand distribution. We call this market-based forecast
sharing. In this case, each retailer can gather information
from a public signal and a private one. The retailer decides
how much to rely on the public signal based on its pre-
cision. We will compare the supply chain performance
under the two types of forecast sharing (Structures A and
M). In addition, we characterize conditions under which
the market-based forecast sharing will outperform the full
information benchmark thus additional benefits can be
generated in the supply chain.
In the following, we present a macro prediction market
model and characterize its equilibrium and properties under
the REE framework. We then use backward induction to
solve the supply chain decision making problems under
Structures A, D, and M. First, we derive the individual
retailer's order decision in the supply chain as a best
1 Using the reciprocal of precision τ to denote variance is a standard
technique in statistics and information economics. We use N to denote
the normal distribution when referring to a distribution, and use Φ and
ϕ to represent the standard normal cumulative distribution function
and the density function, respectively.
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response function to the manufacturer's wholesale price.
Then we solve the manufacturer's optimal pricing problem
according to the expected aggregate orders from the
retailers. We also characterize how the level of information
sharing affects the supply chain partners' decision making.
3.1. The macro prediction market
The construction of the macro prediction market is an
important market mechanism design issue that evokes
various discussions. For our purposes, the trading asset is a
futures contract based on a retail index θ, whose payoff
depends on the future likely outcome of macro economic
events such as retail sales. For simplicity, we assume that
one share of the retail indexwill pay outmonetary units θ.2
The current price of the futures contract is denoted by p.
We assume that the macro prediction market operates
like an open book call futures market (see [12] for a refe-
rence). The market opens at a pre-specified time, before
which traders can update their orders according to their
new information. Trades take place at an equilibrium price
reflecting traders' regret-free trading decisions. For the
sake of liquidity, we assume that only the risky asset θ is
traded at the initial running of the market. Aggregate
market information is revealed after the settlement for
transaction of θ. At this point, nobody has an informational
advantage to arbitrage the market. The market is complete
and efficient under the REE. Once the index price is set,
the index-based derivatives can be properly priced, and
various index-based derivatives can be traded. Therefore,
our macro prediction market allows for derivatives trading
which can be used for risk hedging purpose (we will dis-
cuss this in Section 5). In the following, we derive the
market equilibriumwhere only one risky asset, θ, is traded.
The way of designing an effective pricing mechanism
is not unique. In this paper, we focus on amarket structure
where the market maker responds to the aggregate net
order by taking an opposite position. We assume that the
marketmaker doesn't have any private information. Thus,
to prevent economic loss, the market maker sets the index
price as the expected value of the future payoff given the
current aggregate net orders in the market.
We assume that there areM risk neutral informed traders
in themarket.M=N+N0,whereN is thenumberof retailers
and N0 is the number of outside traders who have relevant
information.We don't distinguish among informed traders'
forecast abilities, but this simplification will not affect our
results. We assume that each informed trader i obtains a
private signal θ˜i=θ+δi, where difN 0; 1sd
 
, and places an
order πi for i=1,…, M.
3 There are also some uninformed
traders (also known as noise traders) whose aggregate net
order is random and exogenously given, i.e.X˜fN 0; 1sX
 
.
Note that the noise traders' assumption incorporates all the
unpredictable elements which may come from agents'
random liquidation demands or irrational behaviors. The
random supply provided by noise traders is crucial in
providing the informed traders with proper incentives to
participate in the market. Informed retailers will earn
positive expected profits at the expense of the noise traders'
expected losses in equilibrium.
The informed trader i takes the price information into
account and strategically orders πi to maximize her
expected return from the macro prediction market.
max
pi
E½ðh−pðyÞÞpij h˜i; p ðIÞ
A REE equilibrium is defined by two components.
First, a trading strategy πi, for i=1,…, M, that solves the
above maximization problem given pricing function p
(y). Second, a pricing function p(y) such that given the
trading strategy πi, i=1,…, M, we have
pðyÞ ¼ E hjy ¼
XM
i¼1
pi þ X˜
" #
ðIIÞ
where y ¼PMi¼1 pi þ X˜ is the aggregate demand. The
following propositions characterize the market equilib-
rium properties.
Proposition 1. For any given number of informed
traders M, there exists a unique linear REE in which
1) An informed trader i adopts a linear trading strategy
πi=β0+β1θ˜i+β2p, where β0, β1, and β2 are constants;
2) The equilibriummarket price p ¼ A0 þ A1 PMi¼1 h˜i þ X˜LÞ,
where A0, A1, and L are constants.
4
From Proposition 1, we can see that the symmetric
linear trading strategy is revealing since an informed tra-
der's private information θ˜i is indirectly transformed into
the trader's market trading volume πi based on any
observed market price p. In turn, observing the index price
3 Without confusion here we use the same notation i to denote both
retailers and outside informed traders.
4 Conjecture and prove the existence of a linear REE is a standard
technique in financial economics literature. Although structurally similar
results are obtained, we are not simply reproducing it since our informa-
tional assumption is different from other available results.We admit that by
focusing on the existence and uniqueness of a linear REE, we do not
exclude the possibility of other non-linear REEs, which is not a general
interest for researchers.
2 Note that we use θ to refer to either the trading asset (the retail
index representing the macro factor) or its random payoff inter-
changeably. Interpretation should take into account the context in
which it is used.
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p is equivalent to observing the signal
PM
i¼1 h˜i þ X˜L
 
, which is
an indicator of the available aggregate market information.
It's worth mentioning that under the notion of REE, traders
strategically reveal and manipulate their private informa-
tion, although such behavior proves to be self-revealing.
The existence of linear REE guarantees that p is also
normally distributed. This fact allows us to characterize
the supply chain partners' belief updates using the Normal
Learning Theorem (actually a standard Bayesian update
formula for normal distribution used in financial market
trading, see Ref. [27]). The uniqueness of the linear REE
guarantees one-to-onemapping from the dispersedmarket
signals to the aggregate market price. L, which often re-
presents market liquidity in the REE literature, reflects the
precision of the information transformation. The larger the
value of L, the less the influence of X˜ . Therefore, p is a
more precise indicator of the useful signals.
The accuracy of aggregate forecasts revealed by the
market price can be increased when the number of in-
formed traders increases.We define price informativeness
as PIu 1
Var½hjp. The uncertainty on θ should be reduced
based on a good prediction p. In other words, the less
variation of θ conditional on p, the more informative the
index price p is. We use the reciprocal to capture this
relationship in the definition.
Proposition 2. Price informativeness PI increases in
M. limMYl PI ¼l and limMYl p ¼ h.
Price precision is a function of the number of informed
traders. Proposition 2 implies that when the number of
informed traders approaches infinity, the information re-
vealed in the macro prediction market will be accurate
enough so that the index price converges to the true value
of the macro factor.
It's worth noting that one retailer's macro prediction
market order will have negligible effect on the information
contained in the index price because the equilibriumprice is
determined by the sum of informed and uninformed tra-
ders' signals. No individual's order is pivotal. In the macro
prediction market, retailers can increase profit by solely
taking advantage of their superior private information. They
do not profit by manipulating their trading orders hoping to
mislead the manufacturer in her supply chain pricing deci-
sion. Therefore, retailers' macro prediction market decisions
and physical supply chain order decisions are perfectly se-
parable. In the following, we study the retailer's decision
problem under different supply chain structures.
3.2. The retailer's decision problem
Suppose all retailers charge a fixed retail price r in the
consumer market. In this paper, we assume the retail price
is exogenously given and cannot be influenced by either
the retailer or the manufacturer. While strategic price de-
termination either from the manufacturer or the retailers'
point of view is an interesting research topic, it is not our
focus here. Introducing too much heterogeneity such as
different prices in different markets or toomuch flexibility
such as pricing decision in the consumer market will dra-
matically complicate our analysis without further incre-
mental value in deriving our main insights.
In the following, we compare retailers' decision prob-
lems under three supply chain structures A, D, and M.We
use superscript a, d and m to distinguish parameters in the
three supply chain structures A, D, and M.
Given the wholesale price sj, for j=a,d,m, the retailer
chooses an order quantity Qi
j, for j=a,d,m, to maximize
the expected profit according to the different information
at each setting. The retailer's decision problem is (RA)
(RD) and (RM).
max
Qai z0
E½rmin½Qai ;Di−saQai j h¯  ðRAÞ
max
Qdi z0
E½rmin½Qdi ;Di−sdQdi j hi˜  ðRDÞ
max
Qmi z0
E½rmin½Qmi ;Di−smQmi j h˜i; p ðRMÞ
where min [Qi
j,Di], for j=a,d,m, is retailer i's sale in the
consumer market. These standard newsvendor problems
have different demand distribution functions representing
the retailer's uncertainty about future demand under dif-
ferent information and supply chain structures. The
optimal order quantity is offered by the newsvendor so-
lution; we only need to characterize the respective dis-
tribution functions. The demand cumulative distribution
function is normal by construction in (RA) and (RD). In
(RM), with the linear price function we derived in Pro-
position 1, the retailer's updated belief, based on the
private signal and public price, will remain normal. We
can apply the Normal Learning Theorem5 (see [27] for a
reference) to derive the analytical expressions for the
distribution functions under Structures A, D, and M.
Lemma 1. Define sv ¼ M−1sd þ 1L2sX
 −1
and h˜−iu
P
jpi h˜j.
Retailer i's optimal order quantity is determined by
Q ji ¼ ai þ bil ji þ
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s ji
q U−1 1− s j
r
 
; for j ¼ a; d;m
5 The Normal Learning Theorem gives the following rule for belief
updates: let the prior distribution hfN l;
1
s
 
, and let θ˜=θ+ ε˜, where
e˜fN 0
1
se
 
and independent of θ. Then, if θ˜i is a realization of θ˜, the
posterior distribution hj h˜ ifN ssþ se lþ
se
sþ se h˜ i;
1
sþ se
 
.
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where
lai ¼
s
Nsd þ s lþ
Nsd
Nsd þ s h¯ ;
ldi ¼
s
sþ sd lþ
sd
sþ sd h˜i;
lmi ¼
sl
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
þ sd h˜i
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
þ ðM−1Þsv
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
h˜−i þ X˜L
 
1
sai
¼ b
2
i
sþ Nsd þ
1
se
;
1
sdi
¼ b
2
i
sþ sd þ
1
se
;
1
smi
¼ b
2
i
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
þ 1
se
:
Lemma 2. limMYl EXlmi ¼ limNYl lai , and limMYl
smi ¼ limNYl sai .
Lemma 3. If N < 1þ M−1
1þ 2 1þM
sd
sð ÞMﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð5M 2−4Þþð4M−2ÞM 2sdsþM2sd
2
s2
q
−M 1þsdsð Þ
;
then smi > s
a
i :
Lemma 2 implies that when both the number of informed
market participants and the number of retailers approach
infinity, the macro prediction market yields a forecast as
accurate as the aggregate forecast in terms of the mean
and variance of the forecasted demand distribution.
Lemma 3 gives a condition under which the retailer's
demand prediction is more precise using the macro
prediction market than aggregate information sharing.
Loosely speaking, given N retailers, the more precise
each retailer's information (represented by τδ /τ), the
more informed market participants are needed before the
macro prediction market forecast will outperform the
aggregate forecast. In addition, given the precision level
of each retailer's information, the more retailers in the
supply chain, the more informed market participants are
needed before the macro prediction market forecast
outperforms the aggregate forecast. This condition is
easy to be satisfied. For example, given τ=1, τδ=2, if
N=4, then M=35; if N=6, then M=77; and if N=20,
thenM=819. But given τ=1, τδ=4, ifN=4, thenM=59;
if N=6, then M=137; and if N=20, then M=1579.
Lemma 3 has important implications in the supply
chain information systems design. In the absence of
good incentives, truthful information sharing among
retailers is problematic. In contrast, our proposed macro
prediction market automatically aligns the retailers'
incentives to reveal their private information. Further-
more, the macro market-coordinated information shar-
ing can absorb useful information from other market
participants. It has the potential to achieve more accurate
forecast than what is available under truthful informa-
tion sharing among retailers.
However, forecast accuracy alone cannot determine
retailer profits because the manufacturer can use the
same information to make pricing decisions.
3.3. The manufacturer's decision problem
The manufacturer wants to choose the most profitable
wholesale price s j, for j=a,d,m, based on the expected
aggregate order from the retailers. We assume that there
is no fixed cost and that unit production cost is a constant,
c. We also assume the manufacturer will produce an
amount equal to her expected orders from retailers. The
manufacturer's decision problems under the three supply
chain structures can be expressed as follows:
max
saz0
ðsa−cÞ
X
i
Qai j h¯
" #
ðMAÞ
max
sdz0
ðsd−cÞ
X
i
Eh˜i ½Qdi 
" #
ðMDÞ
max
smz0
ðsm−cÞ
X
i
Eh˜i ½Qmi jp
" #
ðMMÞ
In the truthful forecast sharing case (MA), the ma-
nufacturer shares the retailers' forecasts and so can
precisely update her belief on all the retailers' demand
distributions and infer retailers' order quantities. A
single wholesale price is set. In (MD), the manufacturer
does not have any information about retailers' orders,
yet also sets a single wholesale price. She takes the
expectations over her prior beliefs about all the retailers'
private signal distributions. In the market-coordinated
forecast sharing case (MM) the manufacturer sets a
contingent wholesale price based on her rational
expectation of the aggregate order quantity conditional
on the current index price p. Since the manufacturer
does not know each retailer's private forecast, she infers
it from the public observed index price p. The following
proposition compares the manufacturer's pricing de-
cisions under different supply chain information
structures.
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Proposition 3. The manufacturer's wholesale prices
under supply chain structures A, D, and M have the
following relations:
( a ) s a is strictly increasing with θ¯ . If h¯ z
a ðNsd þ sÞðTd −Ta Þ þ bl ½ ðNsd þ sÞTd − sTa 
bNsdTa
; then
sa≥ sd. Otherwise, sa<sd.
(b) sm is strictly increasing with p. If pz a
b
Td−Tm
Tm
þ l T
d
Tm
,
then sm≥sd. Otherwise, sm<sd.
(c) If h¯ z T
mðaþ bpÞðNsd þ sÞ−Ta½aNsd þ sðaþ blÞ
bNsdTa
; then
s
a≥ sm. Otherwise, sa<sm.
where a¼P N
i¼1 ai; b¼
P N
i¼1 bi; and T
j ¼ P N
i¼1
1ﬃﬃﬃ
s ji
p
 −1
for j ¼ a; d;m:
Proposition 3 details the conditions related to the
manufacturer's pricing decision. Both 3(a) and 3(b) say
that under truthful forecast sharing or macro prediction
market-coordinated forecast sharing, there is a critical
fractile above which the manufacturer will tend to set a
higher wholesale price in supply chain Structure A andM
than in Structure D. Proposition 3(c) further characterizes
the relationship between aggregate signal θ¯ and index
market price p: a low indexmarket price is likely to induce a
low sm, and vice versa.
The wholesale price increases in both truthful forecast
signal θ¯ and the index price p since higher values reflect an
aggregate perception of a prosperousmacro economy in the
future. Themanufacturer thus expects to reapmore benefits
by charging a high wholesale price. In the same situation,
retailers tend to place larger orders than what they would
based on just their own information. This seems to con-
tradict the practice of quantity discounts, i.e., the higher the
order quantity, the lower the wholesale price. The un-
derlying driving force of this result is due to the manu-
facturer's confidence that the overall market condition is
prosperous and her bargaining power in setting the market
price. Although in such case the unit order cost increases,
retailers can be compensated by the likely increased
demand that is accurately predicted by themacro prediction
market. In contrast, without the market prediction, the
retailers will order according to their decentralized solu-
tions. They face the opportunity cost of lost sales if demand
surges. Therefore, the retailer will still be able to earn a high
total profit even with a lower unit profit margin.
On the contrary, if the aggregate forecast signal θ¯ or the
indexmarket price p is low, retailers will generally believe
that the macro economy will worsen and so order less.
The manufacturer may set a low price to encourage more
orders in such an economic downturn. This is also accu-
rately predicted by the macro prediction market. In this
case, retailers' misfortunewill be essentially compensated
by the lower unit ordering price.
The index market price creditably conveys retailers'
private forecasts about macro economy uncertainty. De-
mand forecast sharing among the manufacturer and
retailers is achieved indirectly via the macro prediction
market. The manufacturer can control retailers' order
variance by adjusting the price in a direction that is
socially desirable from the perspective of the supply
chain. This adjustment is especially important in
reducing the bullwhip effect.
4. The value of forecast sharing
We investigate two aspects of forecast sharing in this
section: the impact on retailers' order variance and the
expected supply chain efficiency.
4.1. The order variance
Retailers experience demand uncertainty from custo-
mers, but themanufacturer experiences it from the retailers.
The manufacturer's decision making improves as retailer
aggregate order variance drops. Under truthful forecast
sharing, there is no order variance because themanufacturer
precisely observes retailers' demand forecast thus perfectly
infers their order quantities. When forecast sharing is un-
available, the decentralized order variances vary according
to the different retailer signals. The macro prediction mar-
ket significantly helps the manufacturer improve her in-
ferred order accuracy.
Proposition 4. Var(Qi
m|p) < Var(Qi
d); Var(Qi
m|p)
decreases inM; limMYl VarðQmi jpÞ ¼ VarðQai j h¯ Þ ¼ 0:
Macro prediction market coordination helps reduce
order variance because retailers can more accurately fore-
cast themacro economy and their owndemand uncertainty.
The manufacturer can also make more accurate inferences
about the macro economy. The macro prediction market
induces less supply chain order variance whenmore useful
information about the macro factor is incorporated. If the
macro prediction market is precise enough, it can replicate
truthful forecast sharing as order variance disappears. This
has important implications for the bullwhip effect. This
well-known informational problem is often represented by
the observed increasing order variances from downstream
partners in the supply chain. The literature has identified
potential sources of the bullwhip effect but has not offered
an effective solution to reduce the effect by properly ma-
naging conflicting incentives among supply chain partners.
Our macro prediction market-coordinated supply chain
structure can alleviate this effect. Note that by imposing a
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correlation across the consumer markets, potentially there
is another dimension of the bullwhip effect— the rationing
game (see Ref. [22]). We don't deal with this problem in
this paper since we do not assume capacity constraints of
the manufacturer.
4.2. The expected supply chain profit
A decentralized supply chain solution is generally sub-
optimal to an integrated, first-best solution. A first-best
solution, which is usually impossible, requires the manu-
facturer to set the wholesale price equal to the marginal
production cost. A number of articles on supply chain
coordination discuss the use of more complex non-linear
pricing contracts or real options contracts to achieve the
first-best solution [7]. However, we are most interested in
determining the best supply chain structure under the
simple price-only contract, the most common contract for-
mat in the supply chain practice. We are interested in eval-
uating the impact of information sharing on overall supply
chain efficiency.
The total expected supply chain profit is determined
by the sum of all supply chain partners' expected profits.
Under the supply chain structures A, D, and M, the
expected supply chain profit can be expressed as
EPj ¼
XN
i¼1
EΠ jR þ EΠ jM
¼ ðr−cÞE
XN
i¼1
Q ji
" #
−rE
XN
i¼1
Ci;jðQ ji Þ;
where Ci;jðQ ji Þ ¼
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
sdi
p Z tj
−l
UðtÞdt; j ¼ a; d;m; and tj ¼ U−1 s jr
 
:
Proposition 5. If min(sd, sm, sa)≥ r/2>c, then the
expected supply chain profit satisfies EΠa>EΠd,
EΠm>EΠd, and limMYl EPm ¼ limNYl EPa.
Proposition 5 shows the value of information sharing
in the supply chain. Under the condition min(sd, sm,
sa)≥ r/2>c the expected supply chain profits under
Structure A and M are greater than profits under Structure
D. This condition is not hard to be satisfied. Since the
manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader in the game, it is not
a surprise that she will charge a wholesale price at least half
of the retail price leaving retailers a smaller profit margin.
Most industry products have retail prices less than two
times the wholesale price. Compared to the decentralized
supply chain, introducing the macro prediction market will
improve supply chain efficiency by increasing the total pie
to be divided, and the manufacturer's expected profit will
increase since she has all the bargaining power. Retailers,
however, may not benefit since the market condition
affects the manufacturer's pricing decision as well as the
division of total supply chain surplus. Retailers' expected
positive profits as a return of their private knowledge will
attract them to trade in the macro prediction market
regardless of the market condition.
Total supply chain efficiency depends on market
liquidity and information transparency, i.e., how much
useful information about the macro factor can be
forecasted and revealed to the supply chain partners. In
general, whether the macro prediction market-coordi-
nated supply chain efficiency will outperform the
aggregate supply chain efficiency depends on the
tradeoff between the level of information asymmetry
and prediction precision. On the one hand, the aggregate
supply chain has no information asymmetry and will
tend to outperform the market prediction. On the other
hand, the market prediction can incorporate useful
outside information and so be more precise. When
both the number of informed traders in the market and
the number of retailers approach infinity, the supply
chain structuresM and Ayield the same expected profits.
The traditional supply chain literature considers the
incentive and coordination issues within a closed system.
Our work sheds new light on this area because of the
additional benefits generated outside the supply chain
system. Since the market is an open system, one retailer's
non-participation decision will not compromise the
information aggregation. But retailers who believe the
market efficiently predicts the macro factor will tend to
incorporate the market price information into their order
decisions. Our proposed framework aligns retailers' in-
centives to share information and explores the value of
useful information from other sources to increase overall
supply chain efficiency.
5. Extensions and discussions
We consider extensions of our model in this section.
First, we investigate how retailers' changing risk pre-
ferences influence their trading strategies. Second, we
characterize the retailer's Pareto improving macro pre-
diction market trading strategy. Third, we extend the index
trading to the index-based derivative trading to demon-
strate that our proposed macro prediction market structure
can support supply chain risk management in corporate
practice. Finally, we discuss the impact of the macro pre-
diction market construction on moral hazard problems.
5.1. The risk-averse retailer
Retailers' supply chain order strategy and macro
predictionmarket trading strategy are perfectly separable
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when they are risk-neutral. Their incentives to trade
come from their superior knowledge about future uncer-
tainty of the economy. No arbitrage opportunities exist
under the REE framework. In equilibrium, no contingent
claim matters to the retailers because they expect to pay
the “average” value of the contingent claim based on the
common market belief. Consequently, retailers cannot
make extra money by trading more complex financial
contracts. Since risk-neutral retailers only care about the
mean effect of their profit, their strategy is simply to trade
the index.
Retailers prefer to purchase the contingent claim as a
type of insurance when they are risk-averse. A key
component in our model is the retailer's piecewise-
linear payoff function, and a kink occurs when the
demand equals order quantity. This type of payoff
function can be hedged via writing covered call options
on the retail index [17]. Given the retailer's order
quantity Qi, trading the contingent claim is a Pareto
improving strategy because the retailer's expected
overall profit is the same in both the macro prediction
market and the commodity market. However, options
can cancel off some uncertainty thus reducing the profit
variance. The contingent claim can be expressed as:
fi ¼ −rmin½Qi; ai þ bih ¼ rmax½−Qi;−ai−bih
¼ −rai−rbihþ rmax½−Qi þ ai þ bih; 0
¼ −rai−rbihþ rðai þ bih−QiÞþ
¼ −rai−rbihþ rbi h−Qi−aibi
 þ
The contingent claim can be generated by borrowing
rai shares of riskless bonds and short selling rbi shares of
the index and long the same shares of call option with
strike price Ki ¼ Qi−aibi
.
Proposition 6. A risk-averse retailer's Pareto improving
macro prediction market strategy when ordering Qi in the
supply chain is to borrow rai shares of riskless bonds and
short rbi shares of the index θ and long rbi shares of call
option with strike price Ki ¼ Qi−aibi .This insurance can deal with the supply chain
operation and macro prediction market uncertainty by
smoothing out the total payoff from both. The future
index price is positively correlated with the retailer's
consumer market demand, so the retailer may face a loss
in her consumer market if it goes down. However, the
retailer can earn a positive profit in the macro prediction
market by short selling. If the future index price goes up,
the retailer will not have enough inventory to cover
demand and will lose in both the macro prediction
market and the consumer market. However, this loss can
be covered by the call options at hand. In any case, the
retailer's risk exposure can be effectively hedged.
In the newsvendor model it is clear that risk-averse
retailers will order less than the expected value-
maximizing quantity [11]. It was shown that, under
very general conditions, the risk-averse retailer's
optimal ordering quantity increases with hedging [13].
Therefore, opportunities for options trading help
optimize retailers' inventory decisions.
5.2. The impact of the macro prediction market
Our macro prediction market-coordinated supply
chain framework can bring risk management into cor-
porate business practice. In the supply chain literature,
risk sharing and transfer are obtained by bilateral con-
tract commitments. Examples of widely used contract
forms include reorder/buy back contracts [28], non-
linear pricing/quantity discount policy [32], and linear
transfer payments [6]. It was shown in [3] that all these
contracts can be classified as real options contracts.
However, the question of whether the options contracts
can be properly priced remains unanswered. Following-
on work [5] proposed pricing real options in a bilateral
contract using Arrow–Debreu securities. We extend the
pricing of options contract in a market setting with
multiple market players. Our proposed options contracts
are based on a risky security (the retail index) with
continuous payoffs. This is more realistic than using
Arrow–Debreu securities.
Options contracts can provide retailers insurance to
deal with operational risk. However, insurance may cause
a moral hazard problem since the retailers may not take
socially conscious actions when they feel economically
secure.Moral hazard problems have beenwell-understood
in economics [15] but are generally overlooked in the
supply chain literature. For example, when the market is
uncertain, a manufacturer may provide retailers with a put
option allowing them to sell back unsold products at a pre-
specified salvage value (the strike price). The retailer may
not put much effort into selling products if the promotion
cost is higher than its opportunity loss. All bilateral real
options contracts suffer this problem. One possible solu-
tion is to write contracts based on macro factors that cor-
relate with the retailer's hedging needs but are not under
the retailer's control. Trading indices or index-based deri-
vatives can solve these problems since they are simply
contingent claims written on the macro factor (the index).
The retailers still incur residual risk in the marketplace. In
addition, options trading can solve the market participa-
tion problem since there might be experts who are
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unwilling to trade in the macro prediction market for fear
of financial losses. Buying or selling options with
preferred strike prices can afford these experts a measure
of protection.
6. Conclusion
The Internet has facilitated real-time information access
across organizations, making it possible to integrate that
information into decision models. While research on sup-
ply chain information systems design has focused on tech-
nological efficiency, such as XML-based workflow and
database integration, our innovation is to build a macro
prediction market into organizations' evolutionary infor-
mation systems design to encourage information sharing
and aid supply chain decision making. We show that the
macro prediction market can be used to reduce the
bullwhip effect in the supply chain. In addition, the market
allows anyone with information to trade. More complete
information makes the supply chain more efficient. We
thus provide important insights in designing market-based
information systems in guiding the structure of supply
chain interactions.
We examine the impact of introducing a new type of
market – a macro prediction market – on supply chain
information sharing and decision making. We also make
unique contributions to the emerging fields of prediction
market and macro hedging market research. Prediction
markets are indirectly influenced by financial markets. The
significance of these markets is still limited to predicting
elections, sport trades, and other utility stocks and no clear
resource allocation issue has yet been studied. In contrast to
existing research, we look at a concrete application in the
class of supply chain problems to validate the significance
of prediction markets for decision support in business
practice.
In the macro hedging market literature, the key to hed-
ging risk is sharing risk. Supply chain partners tend to act
strategically in providing information due to payoff asym-
metry thus preventing effective risk sharing. The strategy
of creating macro indices to trade instead of trading phy-
sical products has a number of advantages. First, the tra-
ding asset is broad enough to attract sufficient liquidity in
the market. The liquidity problem has been identified as an
important reason for the failure of many B2B markets.
Many industrial products are not suitable for market tra-
ding because of a lack of homogeneity. In addition, con-
tracts specifying different quality, delivery times and other
features are usually negotiated between buyer and seller,
and so generate high transaction costs. Index-related fi-
nancial contracts, in contrast, are essentially homogeneous
products that can be traded with sufficient liquidity. Risk-
pooling can be realized without costly negotiation and
contract enforcement between parties. Therefore, the crea-
tion of the macro prediction market makes possible the
sharing of economic risks. The macro index-related finan-
cial contracts are also general enough to reduce the moral
hazard problems arising from bilateral insurance contracts.
Certain limitations apply to this paper. We assume the
retail prices are exogenously given and are the same for
all retailers. Endogenizing the pricing decision is an
interesting research question that can be studied in the
future. Allowing different retailers to charge different
retail prices sounds a more realistic relaxation. In the
case of heterogeneous retail prices the manufacturer can
be expected to also set heterogeneous wholesale prices.
Future work could extend this research to cases with
multiple manufacturers and retailers. The construction of
the index should also be studied. Different indices could be
designed to represent a variety of products or tangible/
intangible assets in the supply chain network. The indices
could be further distinguished to reflect regional envi-
ronmental economic risks. More innovative and complex
financial instruments, such as index-based derivatives, can
also be introduced for risk hedging purposes. In addition,
future researchers can extend our findings to other business
applications.
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Appendix A
Sketch of Proof of Proposition 1. We look for a linear
equilibrium of the form
lmi ¼ a0 þ a1 h˜i þa2p
pi ¼ b0 þ b1lmi þ b2p
pðyÞ ¼ k0 þ k1y
8<
: ð1Þ
FOC w.r.t. πi from Eq. (I) together with the equality
in Eq. (II) we have the following
b0 ¼ 0; b1 ¼
1
k1
; b2 ¼ −
1
k1
ð2Þ
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p¼ k0 þMa0
M þ 1−Ma2 þ
a1
M þ 1−Ma2
XM
i¼1
h˜i
þ k1
M þ 1−Ma2 X˜uA0 þ Ai
XM
i¼1
h˜iþ X˜L
 !
ð3Þ
where L ¼ a1
k1
. So A0 ¼ k0 þMa0M þ 1−Ma2 and A1 ¼
a1
M þ 1−Ma2,
which are constants for given M.
To ensure that Eq. (I) is a well-behaved concave func-
tion of πi, SOC w.r.t. πi from Eq. (I) yields λ1>0.
To solve theREE,weonlyneed to solve for constantsα0,α1,
α2, λ0, and λ1. From Eq. (3) and Normal Learning Theorem,
p ¼ E hjPM
i¼1 h˜i þ X˜L
h i
¼ sl
sþM2sp þ
Msp
sþM2sp
ðM þ 1−Ma2Þp−ðk0 þMa0Þ
a1
,
where sp ¼ Msd þ 1L2sX
 −1
.
Rearranging terms and comparing with p(y)=λ0+
λ1y yields
a1ðsþM 2spÞ ¼ MspðM þ 1−Ma2Þ ð4Þ
a1sl ¼ Mspðk0 þMa0Þ ð5Þ
Belief update by the Normal Learning Theorem
yields
lmi uE hj h˜i; h˜−i þ
X˜
L
" #
¼ sl
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
þ sd h˜i
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
þ ðM−1Þsv
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
h˜−i þ X˜L
 !
;
where sv ¼ M−1sd þ 1L2sX
 −1
.
Substituting Eq. (3) into μi
m yields
a0 ¼ a1sl−ðM−1Þðk0 þMa0Þsv
a1½sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
ð6Þ
a1 ¼ sd−ðM−1Þsv
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
ð7Þ
a2 ¼ ðM−1ÞðM þ 1−Ma2Þsv
a1½sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
ð8Þ
Since we have 5 unknowns α0, α1, α2, λ0, and L in the
system of Eqs. (4)–(8). So it's solvable.
We suppress the expressions for all other parameters
but L:
L ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð5M 2−4Þs2 þ ð4M−2ÞM2ssd þM2s2d
q
−Mðsþ sdÞ
2ðsþMsdÞMðM−1ÞsX
vuut
sd
ð9Þ
So L is a uniquely determined constant for given M.
Define k0=β0+β2p, and k1=β1, then πi|p=k0+k1θ˜i.
So at the equilibrium price an agent's order strategy is
information revealing. □
Proof of Proposition 2.
PIu
1
Var½hjp ¼
1
Var hjPM
i¼1
h˜i þ X˜L
	 
 ¼ sþM 2sp
¼ sþM 2 L
2sX sd
ML2sX þ sd
Substituting L2 from Eq. (9) and consider N→∞
yields
lim
MYl
PI ¼ lim
MYl
s
þ Msd
1þ 2ðsþMsdÞðM−1Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃð5M2−4Þs2þð4M−2ÞM2ssdþM2s2dp −MðsþsdÞ
¼l
lim
MYl
p ¼ E hj
XM
i¼1
h˜i þ X˜L
" #
¼ sl
sþM 2sp þ
Msp
sþM 2sp
XM
i¼1
h˜i þ X˜L
 !
¼ h
This completes the proof. □
Proof of Lemma 1. Since we formulate the retailer's
problem as the traditional newsvendor problem, the
newsvendor solutions give us Q ji ¼ F−1i; j 1− s
j
r
 
, j=a,d,
m, where Fi,j(·) denote the forecasted demand distribu-
tion by retailer i under scenario j. Normalizing the
expression we write it as Q ji ¼ ai þ bil ji þ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s ji
q U−1 1− s j
r
 
where μi
j and
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s ji
q
are derived as follows:
Recall that h¯ ¼ 1
N
X N
i¼1
h˜i. It's easy to verify that θ¯ is
normally distributed, h¯ fN l; 1s þ 1Nsd
 
.
Based on the Normal Learning Theorem, the belief
update yields
laiuE½hj h¯  ¼
s
Nsd þ s lþ
Nsd
Nsd þ s h¯
ldi uE½hj h˜i ¼
s
sþ sd lþ
sd
sþ sd h˜i
lmi uE hj h˜i; h˜−i þ
X˜
L
" #
¼ sl
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
þ sd h˜i
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
þ ðM−1Þsv
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
h˜−i þ X˜L
 !
;
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where sv ¼ M−1sd þ 1L2sX
 −1
.
Var½Dij h¯  ¼ b2iVar½hj h¯  þ
1
se
¼ b
2
i
sþ Nsd þ
1
se
u
1
sai
Var½Dij h˜i ¼ b2iVar½hj h˜i þ
1
se
¼ b
2
i
sþ sd þ
1
se
u
1
sdi
Var½Dij h˜i; p ¼ b2iVar½hj h˜i; p þ
1
se
¼ b
2
i
sþ sd þ ðM−1Þ2sv
þ 1
se
u
1
smi
This concludes the proof. □
Proof of Lemma 2 and 3. Results are directly obtained
by Lemma 1 and Eq. (9). □
Proof of Proposition 3.
Qai j h¯ ¼ ai þ bi
s
Nsd þ s lþ
Nsd
Nsd þ s h¯
	 

þ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
sai
p U−1 1− sa
r
 
ð10Þ
Eh˜i ½Qdi  ¼ ai þ biEh˜i ½ldi  þ
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
sdi
p U−1 1− sd
r
 
¼ ai þ bilþ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
sdi
p U−1 1− sd
r
 
ð11Þ
Eh˜i ½Qmi jp ¼ ai þ biEh˜i ½lmi jp
þ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
smi
p U−1 1− sm
r
 
¼ ai þ bip
þ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
smi
p U−1 1− sm
r
 
ð12Þ
Note that μi
m=E[θ|θ˜i,p], and Eθ˜i[μi
m|p]=Eθ˜i[E[θ|θ˜i,p]]=
E[θ|p]=p. Substituting Eqs. (10)–(12) into (MA), (MD),
(MM) and taking FOC w.r.t. s j, for j=a, d, m, we have
U−1 1−
sa
r
 
þ Ta aþ b s
Nsd þ s lþ
Nsd
Nsd þ sh¯
	 
 
¼ s
a−c
r
 
1
/ U−1 1− sar
   ð13Þ
U−1 1−
sd
r
 
þ Tdðaþ blÞ ¼ s
d−c
r
 
1
/ U−1 1− sdr
  
ð14Þ
U−1 1−
sm
r
 
þ Tmðaþ bpÞ ¼ s
m−c
r
 
1
/ U−1 1− smr
  
ð15Þ
where a ¼PNi¼1 ai; b ¼PNi¼1 bi; and Tj ¼ PNi¼1 1ﬃﬃﬃsjip
 −1
for j=a,m,d.
Let x0=c / r, xj= s
j / r, tj=Φ
−1(xj), for j=a,d,m. Using
the equality Φ−1(1−xj)=−Φ−1(xj) and, simplifying the
expression, we derive
Ta aþ b s
Nsd þ s lþ
Nsd
Nsd þ s h¯
	 
 
¼ UðtaÞ−x0
/ðtaÞ þ ta ð16Þ
Tdðaþ blÞ ¼ UðtdÞ−x0/ðtdÞ þ td ð17Þ
Tmðaþ bpÞ ¼ UðtmÞ−x0/ðtmÞ þ tm ð18Þ
Let gðtÞ ¼ UðtÞ−x0
/ðtÞ þ t. Then g
VðtÞ ¼ /ðtÞ/ðtÞ−ðUðtÞ−x0Þ/
VðtÞ
/2ðtÞ þ
1 ¼ 2þ tðUðtÞ−x0Þ
/ðtÞ , where the second equality follows by
the fact that /′(t) =− t/(t). Since Φ(t) is strictly
increasing and /(t) is a strictly decreasing function of
t when t≥0, g′′(t)>0 for t≥0. We also know that tj is
strictly increasing with sj.
Comparing Eqs. (16), (17) and (18), we derive all the
results for (a) – (c). □
Proof of Proposition 4.
VarðQdi Þ ¼ b2iVarðldi Þ ¼
b2i s
2
d
ðsþ sdÞ2
Varðh˜iÞ
¼ b
2
i s
2
d
ðsþ sdÞ2
d
1
s
þ 1
sd
 
¼ b
2
i sd
sðsþ sdÞ
VarðQmi jpÞ ¼ b2iVarðlmi jpÞ
¼ b2i
sd−ðM−1Þsp
sþsd þ ðM−1Þ2sp
" #2
1
s
þ 1
sd
 
Comparing equations yields Var(Qi
d)≥Var(Qim|p)
with equality holds when M=1. So Var(Qi
d)>Var(Qi
m|
p) when M≥2.
Note that VarðQmi jpÞ ¼
b2i s
3
dðsþ sdÞ
s½ððM−1ÞL2sX þ sdÞðsþ sdÞ þ ðM−1Þ2L2sX sd2
,
substituting Eq. (9) we can see it is a decreasing function
of M. limMYl VarðQmi Þ ¼ 0. Clearly Var(Qia|θ¯ ) =0
since full information sharing is imposed. □
Proof of Proposition 5. The expected supply chain
profits under Structure D, A, and M are
EPd ¼ ðr−cÞE
XN
i¼1
Qdi
" #
−r
XN
i¼1
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
sdi
p Z −td
−l
UðtÞdt
¼ ðr−cÞ aþ bl− 1
Td
td
 
−
r
Td
Z −td
−l
UðtÞdt
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EPm ¼ Ep ðr−cÞE
XN
i¼1
Qmi jp
" #
−r
XN
i¼1
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
smi
p Z tm
−l
UðtÞdt
( )
¼ ðr−cÞ aþ bl− 1
Tm
Etm
 
−Ep
r
Tm
Z tm
−l
UðtÞdt
	 

EPa ¼ Eh¯ ðr−cÞE
XN
i¼1
Qai j h¯
" #
−r
XN
i¼1
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
sai
p Z ta
−l
UðtÞdt
( )
¼ ðr−cÞ aþ bl− 1
Ta
Eta
 
−Eh¯
r
Ta
Z ta
−l
UðtÞdt
	 

Therefore,
E½Pm−Pd ¼ ðr−cÞ td
Td
−
Etm
Tm
 
þ r
Td
Z td
−l
UðtÞdt−Ep rTm
Z tm
−l
UðtÞdt
	 

> ðr−cÞ td
Td
−
Etm
Tm
 
−Ep
r
Tm
Z tm
td
UðtÞdt
	 

> ðr−cÞ td
Td
−
Etm
Tm
 
−
r
2Tm
ð−Etm þ tdÞ
>
r
2
−c
  td
Td
−
Etm
Tm
 
where the next to the last inequality follows from the
condition minðsm; sdÞ > r
2
so that −tm ¼ U−1 1− smr
 
< 0 and
−td ¼ U−1 1− sdr
 
< 0. The last inequality requires that r
2
> c.
By Eqs. (17) and (18), 1
Td
gðtdÞ ¼ aþ bl ¼ aþ bEp ¼
1
Tm
EgðtmÞ > 1Tm gðEtmÞ. The inequality follows by the strict
convexity of g(t) when t≥0. Note that g(0)≤0. For
k ¼ T
d
Tm
< 1, we have gðtdÞ > T
d
Tm
gðEtmÞ > g T
d
Tm
Etm
 
. So
tdz
Td
Tm
Etm. Therefore,E[Πm−Πd]>0. That is,EΠm>Πd.
E½Pa−Pd ¼ ðr−cÞ td
Td
−
Eta
Ta
 
þ r
Td
Z td
−l
UðtÞdt−E
h¯
r
Ta
Z ta
−l
UðtÞdt
	 

> ðr−cÞ td
Td
−
Eta
Ta
 
−E
h¯
r
Ta
Z ta
td
UðtÞdt
	 

> ðr−cÞ td
Td
−
Eta
Ta
 
−
r
2Ta
ð−Eta þ tdÞ
>
r
2
−c
  td
Td
−
Eta
Ta
 
By Eqs. (16) and (17), 1
Td
gðtdÞ ¼ aþ bl ¼ 1Ta EgðtaÞ >1
Ta
gðEtaÞ. Since τia>τid, T a>T d. For k ¼
Td
Ta
< 1, we have
gðtdÞ > T
d
Ta
gðEtaÞ > g T
d
Ta
Eta
 
. Therefore, EΠ
a
>EΠ d.
By Lemma 2, limMYl EXlmi ¼ limNYl lai ; and
limMYl smi ¼ limNYl sai . The same forecasts yield
the same expected supply chain profits. □
Proof of Proposition 6. Under REE, trading options
neither increases retailers' macro prediction market pro-
fit nor affects their order quantity; the expected mean of
retailers' profit is the same. However, by smoothing off
the uncertain payoff function, the variance of wealth is
decreased. It is a Pareto improving strategy for risk
averse retailers. □
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